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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to study the identity 
construction of the Lebanese Phalange Party, postulating 
that its view of the Other is deeply entrenched within its 
own development. Strongly regarded as a model of Fascist 
thought and action, the Phalange, as a popular 
manifestation of Maronite nationalist thought, Lebanonism, 
seems to be destined for eternal clash with a similarly 
endless Other, but this latter is not formulated on religious 
basis only: the conceptual idea behind the other remains the 
same throughout the Kataeb’s history of conflict, but its 
face changes as the nature of the threat to the Phalange’s 
political and economic interest changes. The Myth of the 
one, static Muslim Other, is thus challenged and 
deconstructed; and taking into consideration the traditional 
political and economic features of Lebanese society, their 
interplay with the state’s institutions, and the Phalange’s 
role as a tool of mobilisation, a more complex 
interpretation of the construction of the self and Other is 
presented.  
Introduction  
Of the parties to the Lebanese Civil War, the 
Phalanges Libanaises have been labelled the most 
organised, disciplined and effective element of 
the Christian preservative Front, if not both fronts 
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of the War. They have similarly gained a 
controversial fascist reputation for their espoused 
ideology. Indeed the party’s identity is one 
closely linked with a reactionary notion of 
preservation, and as the manifestation of 
Maronite National discourse possessing a 
minority complex the Phalange has the tendency 
to define itself in opposition to the Other. By that 
I mean to stress that it espouses an ideology that 
is itself more conscious of the other compared to 
similar nationalist thought: certainly any 
nationalist notion, by setting out its own 
characteristic excludes that of Others, but the 
ratio of emphasis is in favour of expressing the 
basis on which it (nationalist thought/notion) has 
a legitimate right to an independent nation: 
common language, common land, historical 
incident or narrative, literature, military greatness 
etc. That, for instance, is the case with French or 
Arab Nationalism. By contrast, the greater part of 
Maronite Nationalist discourse (Lebanonism), on 
which the Phalange is based, is far more 
concerned with the ‘Other’. In many ways in fact, 
it could be argued that the Phalange was created 
as a reaction to one or more Other.  
But this Other is not, as I wish to argue, a static 
one based on the traditional religious discourse, 
but rather one that is more dynamic, and viewed 
with the lens of political and economic interests 
and objectives. As a party, the Phalange does not 
espouse a different or innovative ideology: it 
2
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rather plays and intermediary role between 
intellectual nationalist thought promoting 
Lebanonism, and the popular masses. As a tool of 
mobilisation it is therefore targeted by its leaders 
against the Other, who varies with the variation 
to the threat imposed on Lebanonism, be that its 
religious, economic or political features.  
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
The research relies both on primary and 
secondary sources, with more weight awarded to 
the latter. The academic writing about the 
Phalange’s history, Maronite identity 
construction and the civil war, serve as a pool of 
knowledge and material that allows an 
interdisciplinary reading into the Phalange’s 
perception of its self, and more importantly, the 
Other. It is important to note that the research is 
not based on a philosophical framework, nor will 
it go about explaining events through different 
philosophical theories about the Other. The 
Philosophical concepts are only used in as much 
as they further clarify and explain the position the 
Phalange takes when it thinks, writes about, or 
interacts with the Other. The philosophers 
referred to are Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques 
Derrida and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with 
particular emphasis on the theory of 
Phenomenology.  
The final part of the paper presents both content 
and discourse analysis of firstly the writings of 
3
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Pierre Gemayel, founder and Chief Advisor of 
the Phalanges Party, and secondly his son 
Bashir’s speeches and interviews in the build up 
to his election as president (1 January 1982 – 23 
July 1982), which should provide corroborating 
support to the interpretation presented. Reference 
to other primary sources such as Kataeb and LF 
anthems, and posters circulated during the civil 
war, will be embedded within the text to further 
show how the Kataeb viewed and interacted with 
the Other.     
Phalange Identity Creation  
The beginning of Maronite Nationalist imaginary 
may be traced back to clergy writing of the 17th 
and 18th century, which was further developed 
during the following century, now by both clergy 
and laity (Entelis 75). The basic tenets to this 
thought is Lebanon's iconic image as a "place of 
refuge" particularly for Christian minorities from 
the Muslim majority of the Muslim, and 
particularly Ottoman empire (Entelis 32). With 
such a "persecutionist mentality" (Entelis 32), it 
is perfectly rational to expect that Maronite 
nationalism would espouse the maintenance and 
preservation of the Maronite community and 
define the nation (a conventionally secular 
notion) along such religious lines. Indeed since 
the 1840s, the Maronite clergy "taught that the 
idea of Lebanonism was tied to Christianity" 
(Suleiman 180). According to Istifan Duwayhi 
4
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"community's history is a continuous struggle to 
maintain national and religious identity in a 
dominant Muslim environment". It was also 
during the 1800s when intellectual nationalist 
discourse began to develop from a strictly 
"Mountain" theory to one that saw the nation in 
terms of living "within a broader political 
framework established and maintained by elite 
families" (Hourani 36). Certainly one cannot say 
that the Maronite community was not particularly 
unified and espoused only one view of life, but 
there was a certain "homogeneity" (Aulas 1) 
particular to it. The fact that the entre Maronite 
community was positioned in one place has 
allowed them to become more self conscious. 
The compact living has seen them share land, 
history, and obviously religion which is the basis 
to their identity (Entelis 34).  
 
Eventually however, the idea was remodeled 
around populist leadership, and eventually, from 
1920 and the Establishment of L' État du Grand 
Liban, it as the "expression of the interests of the 
commercial cities where men must meet in peace 
to do business" that tuned political development 
to an interconfessional dynamic (Hourani 36).  It 
is this complex notion that the Kataeb has 
adopted ever since its inception: an inherent 
contradiction strongly present in its nascent 
formulation. The party promotes what is referred 
to as a "secular interconfessional Lebanonism, 
albeit with strongly Maronite roots" (Entelis 34). 
5
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It is the populist representation of the ideologies 
of the mountain, of a minority and its view of the 
state, its motto is God, Fatherland and the family 
(a strong religious proclamation if ever there 
was), its chief ideologue has elaborated six 
similarities between the Phalange and religion in 
terms of their principles and teachings and it 
harbours strong relations albeit "personal" with 
Maronite Clergy" (Hottinger 138). And yet there 
is a constant attempt to emphasise the secular 
element. In fact the six similarities were 
explained to show little the party was basing its 
belief-system on religion, and rather on secular 
notions of citizenship. Despite this 
"supranational" discourse of Lebanonism, it is 
"apparent that Maronite nationalism was their 
prime motive and concern" (Kaufmann 181).  
 
The absence of the party's (or the youth 
movement when it was first created) 
idiosyncratic ideology is not a sign of 
precariousness: through its creation the Kataeb 
"reaffirms the political aspirations of the 
Maronite community" in terms of pursuing 
independence from France and rejecting attempts 
to intensify the "Arab character" of Lebanon 
(Aulas 16). One would not be exaggerating in 
saying that the youth movement was in fact 
created as a reaction to the threat of the Other, the 
latter being two in the 1930s: the French colonial 
power, Syrian nationalism as expressed by Antun 
Sa'adeh's SSNP and Arab nationalism that was 
6
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"manifesting itself in the late 1930s and early 
1940s" (Entelis 21). Though once useful to the 
Maronite community, French presence had long 
outlasted its appeal and utility and through this 
first interaction we begin to see the pragmatic 
and politically expedient conditions upon which 
the Phalange views and constructs the Other i.e. 
its use to the preservation of the state with its 
confessional politics and current power relations 
that favour Maronite hegemony, and the state's 
independence from colonial power or threats of 
accession or incorporation into a bigger entity. 
Once French colonialism was hampering the 
elite's political interest, France became the other, 
and the Phalange was one of the principal actors 
calling for independence and the creation of the 
1943 National pact. In this latter it had conceded 
to Lebanon having an "Arab Face" but rejected 
that Lebanese national interest be subordinated to 
greater Arab interests (Suleiman 246). The threat 
of being absorbed into the predominantly Muslim 
Syria was a recurrent fear of the Maronite 
community.  Though both Syrian and Arab 
nationalist are secular notions, they threatened 
the "Lebanese homeland as a sovereign and 
independent state", an idea that they self-
appointed to "foster and safeguard". The extent 
of the danger they felt to be presented by the 
Other was also expressed during the events of the 
1958 civil war, which they called "a war of 
survival" that could determine "whether or not 
7
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Lebanon would cease to exist as a separate 
entity" (Suleiman 235). 
  
This secular view of the Other does not diminish 
the fact that Arabism for instance was connected 
to Islam, at least in Phalangist world view 
(Entelis 80). Karim Pakradouni, an experienced 
and intellectual Kataeb leader, has professed that 
in many ways "Lebanese interests coincide with 
Maronites: one might say that Christians are 
more Lebanese and Muslims are more Arabs" 
(Pakradouni qtd. in Entelis 80). It is the same 
man that also once said that the Phalange, as a 
populist party, had a "well determined mass", 
hinting perhaps to a religiously based Maronite 
following.  
  
In creating the Phalange first as a youth 
movement as a defender of the state against the 
threat of the Others, the Phalange declared its 
intent to help strengthen the state. What is 
perhaps unusual is its self appointed duties and 
objectives which see it act almost like the state 
and the government, a strong emphasis on 
identity as a "super vigilante" (Stoakes), that, 
would "take action, meet all the demonstrations 
with bigger demonstrations, strikes with more 
extensive strikes, toughness with toughness, and 
force with force" should the state fail to do so 
(Pierre Gemayel quoted in Stoakes 222). The 
Kataeb, in its own identity construction, sees 
itself as a state tool of propaganda and 
8
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indoctrination when it comes to "fostering public 
devotion to [the state]" (Stoakes 223), and at 
times, the state's replacement. The important 
implication of this is that it allows itself 
unconditioned responsibility, and more 
importantly, the right, to confront the Other.  
 
Political Entrance  
With the French Mandate era, the Phalange's own 
mandate as a force of liberation expire, and yet 
the Other is still present in the two competing 
forms of nationalism. Considering itself, as 
abovementioned, to be entitled to challenge the 
Other and keep him in check was of the reasons 
behind the transformation of the youth movement 
into a fully operating political party. Other 
reasons included of course greater outlets for 
mass indoctrination and mobilisation, as well as 
to gain more political power vis-à-vis other 
national political forces (Entelis 61). The 
emphasis however is on how even the country's 
own ideology and identity is transformed as a 
result of the activities of the other. The move to 
stress the individual in its ideological writing was 
to oppose the socialist notions of SSNP and other 
Leftist parties that evaluated a person's worth on 
the group or society to which it belongs (Entelis 
72).   
  
The realities of the political process allowed the 
Phalange's inherent contradictions to rise to the 
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surface, as the seemingly espoused secular notion 
came to clash with the incompatible "traditional 
and entrenched values of society, such as 
communal belongings" which rendered the party, 
a product of both "Christian and Maronite" 
thought (Jean Sharaf, Kataeb Official quoted in 
Lebanese Forces Documentary). 
  
Phoenicianism 
As a product of Maronite elite thought, 
Phoenicianism certainly found its way into 
Phalangist popular discourse, albeit much diluted 
to accommodate the complex thought of Michel 
Chiha and others associated with the party. The 
effect of the Phoenician notion and the extent of 
its dissemination to the masses are difficult to 
measure, though one can see how it can be used 
as a tool of indoctrination of identity and 
opposition to the Other. Espousing that Lebanon 
had both an irreducible geographic reality whose 
"true" borders were restored in the 1920, as well 
as a historical reality in terms of civilising 
mission, serve to legitimize Maronite nationalism 
(for they are the people of that geographic land), 
and distance it from the Arab world by presenting 
a continuity of Non-Arab heritage. 
 
A Levantine Model of Fascism  
 
That the Phalange holds some fascist elements to 
its identity is undeniable: the name is one clear 
10
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manifestation. Following the precedence of other 
youth movements created in the Arab world in 
the 1930s and 1940s, the Phalange was created 
by Pierre Gemayel and four other Christians after 
Gemayel’s return from the 1932 World Cup held 
in Germany. From this experience he was 
inspired to model his youth movement around the 
Nazi party, whose discipline, strength, 
organisation and “self confidence” were amongst 
its many attributes (Entelis 44).  Yet the Phalange 
cannot be considered an identical replica of the 
Nazi, or even of the Spanish Phalanges and the 
Italian Fascist Party. Its leaders exhibited no 
absorption of extreme and xenophobic Nazi 
ideology, and seem to have concerned 
themselves with the physical characteristics 
rather than racial supremacist notion. The 
Phalange was thus a  "nationalist youth 
movement devoted more to athletic training for 
the purpose of combat than to political power per 
se", the Kataeb's early organizational structure, 
like the Nazi, was based on the militia, and a 
women's auxiliary constituted a separate although 
closely affiliated thirteenth department of the 
Maslahah (Entelis 22).  It seems then that the 
only possible similarities were one of a 
superficial nation (Entelis 44): the Phalange 
modeled the form but not the substantive thought. 
Its substantive element was instead the product of 
local conditions and local Others.  
 
The Other in the Eyes of the Phalange  
11
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This distinction made above between the 
Phalange and Nazi Party for instance, is 
important if we are to understand the extremity to 
which the Phalange denotes its view and 
interaction with the Other. Although in constant 
and endless confrontation with it, the Phalange 
never took a pledge to exterminate the Other, not 
only for their sheer numbers, but the lack of 
political and economic wisdom that would mean.      
 
Philosophical Interpretation    
The Concept of the Other and the act of 
"Othering" are essentially sociological and 
anthropological notions that are based to a large 
extent on perception. Their importance lies in 
their consequences, what an individual or a 
group's view of the other may entail in terms of 
hierarchy and power relations. Foucault finds a 
strong connection between othering, and "power 
and knowledge", for when we “other” another 
group, we point out their perceived weaknesses 
to make ourselves look stronger or better 
(Engelund). It implies a hierarchy, and it serves 
to keep power where it already lies. 
Anthropologically, the Phalange may view its 
Other as a fossil or savage other (Sarukkai 1406), 
albeit in a diluted way to that of colonialism for 
instance. The Other, be it a Syrian or Arab 
Nationalist, belongs more to the East and is less 
advanced than the Western-oriented, Lebanon of 
12
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the Phoenician civilisation. The Other also 
carries with him the remnants of a decaying 
political and social system, namely the Ottoman 
Empire. But the Phalange is not entirely 
dismissive and reductionist in its view of the 
Other. Similarly a Sartrean master-slave conflict 
also presupposes that something exists which in 
scarcity must be shared. In Phalange interaction 
with the Other we do not see domination or 
modeling of this master-slave conflict. But the 
contradiction herein again lies in the dual 
concepts the Phalange tries to espouse, one of 
difference and equality. The Maronite is clearly 
different from if not in certain ways superior to 
the non-Maronites, particularly Arab. The 
Current political system allows for their 
hegemony. To preach secularization and equality 
of sects is impossible, seeing that the act of 
distinguishing between the self and the other 
establishes a hierarchy and a form of legitimacy 
for the status quo.  
The theory of phenomenology stipulates that 
whatever we experience or understand is bound 
by our subjective presence and perception, which 
takes away any agency from the other. By 
Contrast, Emmanuel Levinas, and later Derrida, 
claim that the Other is in and of itself a reality 
which can never be fully comprehended and 
provokes the subject’s thought (Reynolds 65). 
The Phalange’s perception lies somewhere in 
between: the Party certainly views the other in 
13
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terms of its effect on itself, and defines it as that 
which may threaten its own identity, but as 
Merleau-Ponty says in defense of 
Phenomenology, when one creates the Other 
from one’s own thought, the process is 
reversible, meaning that “the other must similarly 
borrow themselves from me, create me with their 
thoughts” (Reynolds 65), and we certainly see the 
Phalange transforming certain ideologies or its 
form in order to adapt to the Other. The Other is 
not deprived of agency, but on the other hand it is 
tangible and known. More importantly the 
Phalange recognises this existence and its 
integral role in society, and for the most part 
chooses to accommodate, within limits, this 
Other, and accept a political solution that sees 
them working together for the state cycle to turn. 
The Other to whom this perception applies is the 
Sunni Muslim Other of the Lebanese state. 
Certainly the Phalange seems to “tolerate him; 
but in fact [it] did not tolerate him as much as 
ignored him. And he could ignore him as long as 
this Muslim did not threaten to challenge” 
Maronite hegemony (Khalaf 46).  In light of what 
Merleau-Ponty said about the Other creating the 
self, it is possible that the non-threatening 
existence of the Muslim  
Within and without Lebanon was important for 
the Maronite/Phalangist self-identification at a 
religious, cultural and social level: the rival 
14
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minaret emphasized the importance of the belfry; 
the bells answered the Allah Akbar; the defeat of 
the Arab armies at the hand of Israel strengthened 
his identification with the West; the mediocrity of 
governmental and Makassed schools enhanced the 
superiority of his own religious educational 
system; the Muslim slum areas contrasted against 
his neat and comfortable petit bourgeois world..” 
(Tewfik 46).                      
Characteristics of Perception  
In times of peace the Phalange continues to 
promote its interconfessional notions of unity and 
cooperation and has expanded its party work 
across the country and throughout various 
regions. Perhaps one such evidence for this is the 
fact that it is not entirely Maronite exclusionary: 
there are around 6% Shiites, 2% Jew, 1% Druze 
and 1% Sunni Muslims and 10% (Greek 
Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Protestant, Armenian 
Catholic, etc.) among 80% Maronite domination 
(Entelis 21). This recognition of Lebanese 
plurality and the need to work with the Other is 
an economic and political decision, suggesting 
that there is more to the Phalange's formulation 
of the other than simply religious lines.  
The other is neither dehumanised nor demonised, 
particularly throughout the Party’s mobilisation 
tools, such as its anthems. Analysing 22 anthems 
of the Phalanges Libanaises, the preponderance 
of the content is more interested in highlighting 
the members’ identity, particularly that of the 
15
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises
Published by AUC Knowledge Fountain, 2016
Azab: Phalanges Libanaises 
16 
 
Mountain, with strong lyrical descriptions of the 
mountain villages. It reaffirms its connection to 
the notions of duty, work and hope. The Kataeb 
proudly site the Lebanese anthem at the top of 
the Party’s list (although not written by a party 
member) which again serves to highlight the 
unbreakable link between the State and the 
Phalanges’ raison d’être. The Christian element 
is also visible with references to the Virgin Mary 
and metaphors of wine. Yet in all of it, little 
reference is made to the other:  only once were 
each of the following words found in the 22 
anthems lyrics (foreigner, enemy, treachery, 
thief, and intruder) and those were only included 
during the anthems pronounced during the more 
extreme events of the civil war. The enemy is 
never defined nor named, and the anthems are 
genuinely non-vocal of the enemy or even the 
Other at large (see Appendix 2).  
As much as its ideological discourse is based on 
Maronite national thought (to a significant extent 
viewing the Muslim as the Other), and as much 
as its Fascist basis sees the Other in terms of Anti 
Lebanese Nationalism (Arab and Syrian 
Nationalism), the Other is also sometimes the 
Left, as a force of reform threatening the political 
institutions of the state that have preserved the 
Maronite economic interests. The Phalange is 
also a political tool of the elite and the state and 
is finely embedded into the establishment: 
government ministers post 1958 have almost 
16
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always included a Phalangist, the party's militia 
are acting as parallels to state apparatus -they 
were sent along with the police to disperse a 
strike held in the AUB in 1972 (Traboulsi 170-
172), and its leaders are "occupationally strictly 
bourgeois men of the establishment the majority 
of whom are over the age of 50” (Entelis 121). In 
fact during the Civil War, the "Phalange, opposed 
to any kind of reform, was repeating, in a 
situation of crisis, its function as defender of 
narrow sectarian privileges in the service of the 
big class interest" (Traboulsi 176). An amalgam 
of these conditions comes together when the 
Muslim is himself the Arab and the force of 
Leftist reform. Even without such a situation 
unfolding, the Phalange already views the Other 
through such complex construction: Arab 
Nationalism they consider to be deeply attached 
to Islam, and the Left to be, not "simple symptom 
of social injustice but represents a conspiracy and 
a fifth column, particularly on the part of 
Lebanon's Arab enemies (Stoakes 218). The 
substance of the Other is thus static, for it does 
not go out of these described borders, but its face 
and form are dynamic, changing with the nature 
of the threat to the Phalange identity and self.  
The view of the Other is sometimes not a whole 
community's, but nuanced with the perception of 
one man in power. Such leaders seeking political 
ambition, can alter the view of the Other to 
include competition even of the same sect and 
17
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eliminate them, perhaps even more cruelly than 
the communal Other, as was the case with 
Bashir's elimination of leaders of militias who 
could have competed with him for the support 
and loyalty of the Christian and particularly 
Maronite community:  in late 1976, those of 
Raymond Edde, in Jubayl; in 1978, those of 
Sulayman Franjiyah, in Zgharta; and in 1980, 
those of Camille Chamoun, in Safra (Aulas 21). 
Civil War Episode  
Although still conscious of the Other and follow 
the same dynamics mentioned above, the civil 
war events introduce certain factors that result in 
great contradictions: at some points the 
Phalange's perception and interaction with the 
other is radicalised to its extremes, at others it 
seems to be rendered to complete breakdown of 
what we expect the Phalange to view the other as, 
albeit only temporarily. These factors are briefly 
the need to prioritise, the various degrees of 
threat (proximal and distant, eminent and far 
removed), which leads to the third: desperate 
times that call for desperate measures. 
The Phalange found itself, as the voice and 
protector of the Maronite community, the force 
of preservation of the and the establishment to 
which it is had become strongly a part of, 
surrounded by several Others, growing in danger 
and threat, and likely inviting more Others to 
interfere in the status quo. There was the "spectre 
18
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of the secular state that would suppress Maronite 
supremacy" (Aulas 18) as espoused by the 
Progressive Party and others calling for reform; 
there was the evidently increasing number of 
Palestinian population and Rogue PLO 
commandos with little respect for Lebanese 
sovereignty and state decisions, and further 
threatening of a potential Israeli invasion to 
eliminate them; and there was thus the combined 
the fear that these progressives "might make 
[use] of Palestinian Armed militias (Aulas 18). 
Coupled with such were the signs of beginnings 
in the breakdown of communal structure amongst 
the young Christian students (Aulas 18). The 
heightened sense of threat and radicalisation of 
the Other is certainly clear: the Other becomes 
almost always the enemy, and was identified in 
the early stages as the Palestinians and 
Communism. That enemy was "the source of all 
evil, be it political, economic, social or otherwise 
(Aulas 19). The minority complex also reappears, 
intensified, the Al'Amal newspaper of the 
Phalange once saying in an issue on August 20th 
1975, that "the political domination of the 
Maronite was the only guarantee for a minority 
condemned to oppression by a majority that was 
oppressive by its very nature as a majority" 
(quoted in Traboulsi 189).  
But despite this radicalisation we still see traces 
of the view of the Other from the times of peace: 
the Phalange, at least in the earlier stages of the 
19
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war, were careful to maintain that the struggle 
was essentially between Lebanon and the PLO, 
which would allow the army to confront and 
eliminate the threat (Sirriyyeh 86). The 
understanding was still that the Lebanese Muslim 
Other was still an integral part of the state 
system, and to ostracize him, or categories him 
along with the PLO, was to contribute to the 
disintegration of the state. A scale of Othering 
thus begins to unfold, with the PLO being quite 
at the top, followed by communism, and again 
the Muslim Other is at least not publicly labelled 
as a threat. The Logic behind this hierarchy of 
Others is very compelling: it takes into 
consideration proximity and the extent of 
eminent danger. The PLO and the camps they use 
as their bases are within the state itself, and are 
consistently showing signs of indifference 
towards the state and aggressive behaviour 
towards Israel that does not make considerations 
for the consequences that may have on the 
Lebanese state. The extent of the threat the PLO 
imposed is reflected in words and actions of the 
Phalange, and by extension the LF. Palestinian 
presence was referred to as a "historical and 
dangerous turn of events"1 (Lebanese Parties 
Documentary) and the events of Sabra and 
Shatila that see the LF reach its extreme 
radicalisation and exterminator mentality, 
emphasize the extent to which the PLO were 
                                                          
 منعطف تاريخي و خطير 1
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considered an existential threat (Zisser 69). But 
always the Phalange viewed its behaviour as 
reactionary. The fault was not theirs, for they 
were only acting in reciprocity to protect their 
state: it was the Palestinians that were elaborately 
creating a state within a state, it was the "bus' 
provocative entrance" into Ein Rummaneh that 
justified the incident, even if there were children. 
(Amin Gemayel, quoted in Lebanese Parties 
Documentary).  
It is therefore this huge imbalance between the 
various Others, and the their eminent defeat to 
the forces of reform coalescing with the PLO, 
that sees the Phalange forego its long Othering of 
Syria, and request, through president Sarkis 
(Rabil 23), that they intervene to their salvation, 
despite the awareness of Syria's continued 
interest in Lebanon. It seemed that the priority 
was to the survival of the Christian front, the 
elimination of the closer Palestinian threat, and 
began a precarious trend of overlooking the long-
term threat of the Other for the sake of the now 
and here and to "help safeguard the community’s 
privileges and secure its political survival" (Rabil 
32), and a few years later breaking with that 
Other and seeing it then as the main threat. The 
contradiction is evident in the way the Christian 
villages welcomed the Syrian Army with rice, 
and how a year later in 1977 the Phalange was to 
turn entirely against their presence as forces of 
occupation (Pakradouni quoted in Lebanese 
21
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Parties Documentary). Similarly, in its 
relationship with Israel, the Phalange (and by 
now LF) leadership shows that it was political 
expediency, pragmatism and ambition that 
determined their decision to ask for Israeli 
intervention. The Phalange may have had few 
links with Israel, but it certainly did not look to 
Israel as a strong ally that parallels its own 
dilemma, but a state that was not interested in 
occupying and acceding Lebanon to its 
territories, but interested in a chance to eliminate 
the PLO and install a friendly regime, that of 
Bashir Gemayel. This myth of a special 
relationship is weakened when again Bashir acts 
in his own self interest and refuses to return the 
favour by signing a peace treaty with Israel 
(Zisser 68), for fear of the repercussions that 
would have on his newly installed presidency and 
whatever ambitions he may still have harboured. 
Selected Political Posters of the Civil War  
If the civil war was widely considered to be “the 
war of the Others”, then posters circulated during 
the war should prove instrumental in analysing 
the representation of the various Others by the 
Phalange. A selection of 12 such posters support 
the hereto explained  national and patriotic 
identity of the phalange, the hierarchic scale of 
Others it has created, as well as its prudence in 
not demonizing or dehumanising particularly the 
Muslim Other.  
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(Images from Zaina Maasri’s Off the Wall, 
Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War) 
 Figure 1 
 
  Figure 2 
 
The image of Lebanon within the 1920 borders 
features heavily throughout the posters, as well as 
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the cedar icon, emblematic of both the Lebanese 
state and the Phalange and highlighting the 
inseparability of both. In a specific poster (figure 
6) the Lebanese Flag and that of the Phalange are 
fused together, with the Phalange anthem 
shedding blood in a scene that reaffirms the 
Phalange’s self appointed role as defender and 
vigilante of the state.  In another poster (figure 
2), Martyrdom is presented through the image of  
a bleeding soldier defending the Lebanon as seen 
within the 1920s border. The Christian element 
appears as well, where figure 1 presents an image 
of a serene and peaceful Christian village where 
the farmers goes about with his livelihood while 
the white dove symbolises peace, and is 
associated with the church bells visible in the 
background. In another image, the subtlety of the 
Arabic language stresses the difference between 
the Phalangist combatant, and the Druze killer 
(by removing the Arabic equivalent of the letter 
M). The combatant is a devout and God fearing 
individual kneeling at the crucifix before he goes 
to fulfil his patriotic duty, where as the Druze 
killer wears traditional clothes that denote a 
barbaric connotation. It is also notably the only 
one that negatively portrays the other.  
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 Figure 10 
On the other hand, representation of the PLO is 
much more violently vocal and uncompromising. 
The massacre of Ein El Rummaneh, a violent 
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incident, is boldly portrayed as “the dawn of 
freedom” and the beginning of the expulsion of 
the enemy and the restoration of the state 
(Figures 9 and 12).  
Figure 9
Figure 12 
 The presence of the Syrian Other high up the 
scale of Othering is similarly poignantly 
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portrayed. In figure 11 a Trojan horse, 
representing treachery and feigned friendship, 
enters the Lebanese state from the Syrian border. 
The Trojan horse lets through hoards of tribes on 
horses, implying barbarity and inferiority, while 
the label is of the ADF, condemning Arab 
conspiracy with the Syrian. The only regions or 
villages labelled are those of Phalange strong 
holds (Zahleh, Ein Rummaneh, and 
Ashraffiyyeh) and reaffirm the Phalange 
perception of the self as the only defendant and 
saviour of the state. Figure three similarly 
portrays a Kataeb-led Lebanon expel a tank 
(presumably Syrian) from Lebanon. Perhaps the 
most symbolic poster representation is that of a 
Phalange body carrying on its back the 
“Lebanese Case” shaped in the borders of 1920 
Grand Liban and racing with a torch titled 
“liberation”, crushing as it does so hoards of 
retarded enemy Arabic tribes and camels. The 
Phalange body has one eye (a pun on the name of 
Ein El Rummaneh where the war erupted and 
which the Phalange perceive as the beginning of 
their patriotic struggle), an eye which a caption 
describes to be always awake when all others are 
sleeping, conveying a notion of an ever vigilant 
eye protecting the nation (see figure 4). 
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Phalango-Israeli Relations: The Myth of the 
Favoured Other 
It is a common misconception that Israel and the 
Phalange have been favourite allies, particularly 
during the civil war. Due to their identical 
predicament - representing minorities surrounded 
by the threat of Muslim majorities and Western 
support- the two political representatives of the 
community were bound to cooperate closely, 
particularly on issues of security. There is a 
consensus that in the nascent stages after the 
breakdown of the Ottoman empire and the 
creation of the Lebanese state, there were 
flirtations between the Jewish Yishuv and 
Maronite community as to potential relations 
(Zisser 890). There is also strong archival 
evidence that that Zionist movement "for its part, 
for many years nursed the dream of a Zionist–
29
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Maronite alliance (there were even those who 
went so far as to speak of a Canaanite–
Phoenician alliance)" (Zisser 400). A discovered 
set of email correspondence between David Ben-
Gurion and Sharrett during the former's voluntary 
exile, in which he expressed how were captivated 
[he was] by the dream of establishing a Western 
and pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon" (Zisser 400). 
There was also at the same time, some Israeli 
leaders entertained the idea of promoting a 
political reversal in Lebanon that would lead to 
the establishment of an Israeli–Maronite alliance. 
The events unfolded differently however: Ben 
Gurion never advanced his dream, probably for 
reasons of political pragmatism, and the "Israeli 
leadership refrained from becoming involved in 
Lebanon’s affairs" (Zisser 400). There is many a 
reason for such a position. Firstly, the 
correspondence was always with individuals 
from the Maronite community whose power base 
was gradually weakening and who had no longer 
expressed the majority's views (Zisser 891). 
Secondly, the Israeli leadership always 
considered the Maronites to be "were too small 
and weak a community for this fellow-feeling to 
have much consequence", and that although "the 
Israelis were not averse to a Phalangist takeover 
in Lebanon; they were, however, dubious as to its 
Prospects" (Rabinovic, quoted in Khashan 322). 
The same notion was expressed a few decades 
later when during a meeting between Franjieh, 
Phalange and the Israelis the latter expressed 
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their unwillingness to be involved in the ongoing 
turmoil (Traboulsi 196). Finally, there was never 
any formal "orderly and binding pattern of 
negotiations between Israelis and Maronites in 
the early years after the establishment of the State 
of Israel" (Zisser 800) that could be used for a 
narrative where the Maronites considered the 
Israelis the Other closest to their self.  
There is in fact very little evidence that the 
Phalange even saw their identity to parallel that 
of Israel or that the latter had any claim of 
legitimacy for Palestine. The party has 
consistently argued that [Palestine was an 
indivisible Arab country, and denounced the 
related UN resolution (Entelis 249). Similarly, 
they point out to having lived in Lebanon since 
time immemorial and own the land where as the 
Jewish state was created out of a Diaspora 
(Entelis 249). Maronite politicians, including 
Pierre Gemayel, "adopted an anti-Israeli stand, at 
least for public consumption" (Zisser 897). The 
Myth that Phalango-Israeli relations were not just 
based on practical politics and restricted to 
money, arming and training only during the civil 
war, but that the relation is built on a strong sense 
of similarity and mutual security needs, therefore 
does not logically follow.  
The only documented encounters between Israeli 
officials and the Phalange have been devaluated 
for their lack of significance and corroborating 
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evidence. Studying Archival material from the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, both Benny Morris and 
Elias Zisser discover that the only two 
correspondences linking the Phalange were 
through indirect channels and it is highly likely 
that the representatives were acting on their own, 
without orders from Phalange leadership. The 
first was a report about an envoy of Archbishop 
Mubarak of Beirut in the 1940s who claimed that 
he spoke on behalf of the Phalange in addition to 
the Archbishop when he expressed Maronite 
interest in taking over the state. Not only were 
the envoy's links to the Phalange verified, but 
neither was his link to the Archbishop. The 
second report was on Elias Rababi, the writer of 
the Phalange AlAmal party. Again he strongly 
espoused certain requests and demands which, 
according to him were Gemayel's, but which 
were never verified, and more importantly, 
Rababi's narrative was in contradiction to the 
events on the ground in Lebanon, of Phalange 
statements and publications, and it is likely that 
he communicated on his own endeavour, and 
similarly also benefit solely from the limited funs 
he'd demand from the Israeli Officials 
(Zisser/Morris).  
 
The Party as a Za’im: Economic Interpretation  
If the extremity of the situation and the 
ostracization of the Other had reached such 
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levels, then a legitimate question would be as to 
why the Phalange, as the leader of the Christian 
Front, did not pursue secession and the creation 
of a small isolated Maronite state. The answer 
again lies in the understanding of the economic 
role the Phalange played, not truly as a party, but 
as a Za’im, a representative of Maronite 
commercial elites, and serving as a tool of the 
establishment.  
Hottinger's definition of a Za’im is one who,  
 in peacetime  is the recognized leader of a 
community who has the power to speak for his 
clients as a group or as individuals, who is expected 
to take action in their and in his interest whenever 
necessary. In peacetime he is the man to whom an 
individual, of a certain traditional outlook in life, 
will go if he has business to transact with somebody 
stronger than himself, and above all, with the 
government (Hottinger 128). 
These features are certainly visible in the 
Phalange’s regular activities. It has played a 
“great role in establishing patronage client and 
offering services” in such a way that while they 
“replaced many regional and clanic notables” 
they nevertheless “fulfilled the same traditional 
function” (Khalaf 45, 47). Where they did not 
replace them, the Phalange “supplanted” them 
but on a much larger scale of organisation and 
efficiency suitable for its enlarged role and 
importance within the state establishment. 
Carrying out such an elaborate system was to a 
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large extent fuelled by the financing provided by 
Maronite elites in the Commerce and Finance 
sectors who had dominated the economic scene 
(Traboulsi 157) and whose interest the Phalange 
represented (Alami).  
The Phalange, as a rather unusual model of a 
Za’im, therefore had many economic interests to 
protect, not only that of the Maronite community 
but particularly their Finance elites. In a report 
presented to the Political Bureau on July 1 1977 
and published in “Beirut Evening” magazine, it 
was expressed that the Phalange sees detrimental 
economic losses if a secessionist stance should be 
taken for two specific reasons: the Maronite 
finance elites were heavily dependent on 
petrodollars and open market relations with the 
Arab and particularly Gulf countries, and funding 
the “petit Liban” could not rely on emigrants 
remittances, would still be “[in] need [of] the 
Arab hinterland” (Khalaf 54) and thus would be 
unfeasible. The report therefore concludes that 
instead of allowing the clash with the Other to 
reach its natural conclusion, the solution was 
elaborated in 3 steps that should (1) sustain and 
consolidate Phalange control over existent areas 
(2) sees further expansion into other regions, in 
order to finally (3) create a real state to weaken 
progressive forces (LNM) and expel the PLO. 
The Other, for reasons of economic interest and 
pragmatism, was not to be blocked out. 
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The Family as the Party: Qualitative Analysis  
In this final section I wish to present content and 
discourse analysis of writing and speeches 
belonging to Pierre Gemayel and his son Bashir, 
as representative of the Phalanges (and its LF 
offshoot) identity and view of the other, at the 
risk of the analysis being prima facie considered 
reductionist. I believe that the nature and 
dynamics of the Phalanges allows the analysis of 
their main iconic leaders’ discourse to be a 
sufficiently accurate representation of the 
Phalanges as a whole. Firstly, a particular figure 
is essential for any fascist party, where the lines 
between the party and the man are usually 
blurred. The leader is the embodiment of the 
party's doctrines and a deep sense of loyalty and 
hero-worship, if not idolatry, are felt towards the 
leader by all the members. That certainly seems 
to be the case of both Pierre and Bashir, whose 
wisdom and strength are reiterated throughout the 
Phalange and LF anthems (Appendix 1). Figures 
7 and 8 also reflect the strong association the LF 
had made between Bashir and the salvation of the 
state, and how particularly after his death, any 
hope for a reconciled and saved Lebanon was 
lost. Secondly, the party decision making process 
is based on a meticulously hierarchical structure 
(Stoakes 223) in which freedom of expression is 
allowed in the lower Aqsams, but there is a 
recognition and acceptance of the fact that the 
final say is that of the Chef at the top of the 
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pyramid. The party exercises strict disciplinary 
and subordinating actions in a greater framework 




Pierre Gemayel: Aradna Lubnan Watanan La 
Kanisatan Wala Gami’an and Connaissances 
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Des Kataeb: Leur Doctrines et Leur Politique 
Nationales 
In both writings there is a strong and highly 
repetitive emphasis of the independence and 
sovereignty of Lebanon2, its particular mission3 
and its incompatibility with the Arab and Syrian 
Other. The extent to which the Other is important 
is sensed throughout the writings, which take a 
defensive position and does not fail to point out 
as much as it can the idiosyncrasy and difference 
of Lebanon. References to Phoenicianism are 
clearly made for the same effect4. Pierre also 
states that the protection of the existence of the 
state is their utmost important duty5, and that 
                                                          
2Le liban a servi au course des siècles, d'asile et de refuge 
aux minorités étniques et religieuses persécutées. 
3Liban est une mission. Cette mission est antinomique à 
celle que les Arabes aspirent généralement à réaliser. Le 
liban est une entité irréductible. 
4 Réalité historique, le Liban moderne, reprenant la 
succession de l’antique Phénicie, s’est constamment 
imposé, depuis six siècles, à l’attention du monde. Qu’on 
veille bien se rappeler le rôle décisif qu’il joua 
politiquement et militairement, dans l’Histoire de l’Orient, 
sous Fakhreddine le Grand, sous l’émir Youssef, sous 
Béchir le Grand et dans la crise internationale de 1840 - all 
what follows Christian figures. No Muslims. 
 
5 L’existence de la Nation libanaise – ayant une vocation 
historique de culture et de tolérance – est un fait que nous 
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they take it upon themselves to indoctrinate the 
youth with Lebanese nationalism. The inherent 
contradiction6 between the claimed secular 
position and the strong Christian roots of the 
Phalange ideology are abundantly clear: on one 
occasion Pierre Gemayel says he is proud to be a 
Christian and honoured to be the voice of this 
group7. Although the ambiance is defiant of Arab 
and Syrian8 other, the Lebanese Muslim is rarely 
                                                                                                
nous sommes donnés pour mission de maintenir, de 
défendre et de renforcer. 
  
L’enseignement, libre et officiel, doit être dirigé dans un 
sens national. La neutralité à l’égard du Liban est 
inadmissible. 
  
Les Phalanges Libanaises sont donc heureuses d'assumer la 
mission de mettre en garde contre les dangers des 
mouvements d'ordre confessionnel qu'agite une fraction des 
habitants du pays.  
  
6 En un mot, nous rejetons vigoureusement toute idéologie 
théocratique qui, dans d’autres pays, est le fondement de la 
constitution : nous sommes pour une législation civile, 
laïque, respectueuse des religions, mais excluant toute 
sujétion à un droit canon déterminé, fût-il chrétien ou 
coranique. 
 
7 Je suis hereux, moi Pierre Gemayel, Chrétien, fier de mon 
Christianisme et attaché à ses préceptes et à ses 
commandements par toutes les forces puisses dans la foi et 
la fidélité. 
 
8 Nous rejetons la théorie d’une Syrie géographique en tans 
qu’elle dénierait la réalité physique du Liban. Cette théorie 
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mentioned, and Gemayel is keen to show respect 
to Islam throughout his discourse. In an 
interesting instant, Gemayel accuses the Other of 
something to avert the same accusation from his 
self: he says that he insists to a new census but 
that the emigrants should be included, not 
because the Maronites would certainly benefit 
from the increased numbers, but because, 
according to him, the Other does not wish to find 
himself in a weakened position 9. 
Bashir Gemayel: Speeches  
Seven years into the civil war, the speeches 
analysed represent a moment deeply imbued in 
the turmoil and are reflected in the more vocal 
and extreme discourse of the Other. Across these 
speeches and interviews, reference to the 
Palestinian and Syrian Other are strongly 
apparent and dominate the content. It is highly 
negative, associating the Syrian with occupation 
and the Palestinian with settlement. They are 
both written as The Palestinian/Syrian, an 
individuation of the enemy in such a way that 
                                                                                                
œuvre d’orientalistes asservis à des politiques 
d’impérialisme, ne repose sur aucun fondement historique. 
 
9  Nous réclamons avec insistance un recensement général à 
condition de ne pas continuer a considérer les émigrés 
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any Palestinian and any Syrian is an occupier, a 
traitor, and as twice mentioned, a parasite.  
The Lebanese Other by contrast, is rebuked, 
reprehended perhaps for his inconsistency, his 
lag in finally realising that it is the Syrian and 
Palestinian that are his enemy and not his 
Christian Lebanese Brother, but never portrayed 
by Bashir to be malevolent or to harbour 
malicious and anti-Lebanese intents. If anything 
he is delayed by his attachment to the decayed 
remnants of the Ottoman “occupation” and is 
easily manipulated and brainwashed by the 
Arabs, he is deluded, and languid: if one is to 
wait for him one will have to wait, according to 
Bashir, for 200 years. Interestingly, Bashir 
resembles his father in both men’s pointing of a 
specific accusation to the Other which just as 
much could be pointed to them: it is only the 
Lebanese (Muslim) Other who can take a 
decision different to or opposing the Christians; 
the latter on the other hand, regardless of what 
decision they take, cannot be considered to 
oppose him. To oppose, to create conflict, is a 
characteristic denoted only to the Other; it is 
inconceivable for the Christian to take a decision 
that can be interpreted as distancing or 
dismissing the Other.  
There is certainly a sense of detachment from this 
Lebanese Other who, regardless of whether he 
sees the light or not, the Christians will go ahead 
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with their plans for liberating Lebanon from the 
Other who in more aggressive terms is also 
labeled the foreigner and the enemy. Israel is one 
other that Bashir rarely mentions, for reasons of 
political pragmatism, and when it is mentioned, it 
is referred to as an independent actor with his 
specific objectives targeting the PLO, who is not 
interested in Lebanon and is therefore neither a 
threat nor an ally of the Christians. In fact in the 
communiqué he released after the Israeli 
invasion, was calm and collected, his words 
expressed no anger or a call for unity against the 
invaders. Israel was only mentioned once and 
only on a passing notice. It is interesting to note 
that the Lebanese Muslim is also referred to, in a 
much moderate sense, as the Sunni, and 
surprisingly, the Lebanese Other, which serves as 
Bashir’s blatant view of the Muslim of Lebanon 
as the Other, rather than a part of a large 
Lebanese Self.  Along such sectarian lines 
Christian supremacy appears quite frequently, not 
in the sense of a superior race, but as the 
community that has taken the vanguard in 
protecting the state and has presented martyrs to 
the cause where as the Muslim Other has not 
recognised who the true enemy is. The 
connection between the Christian community and 
the state of Lebanon is undeniable, with strong 
emphasis on Mountain’s position as the core and 
centre of the Lebanese state, emphasis on the 
borders that create a Lebanon of 10452 Km2 and 
that extends back to a 6000 years old civilization, 
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giving the Christian community at least 
legitimacy to its claim in this struggle as opposed 
to the less decorated Other.  
There was one particular speech which embodied 
the whole spirit and the dynamics behind 
Bashir’s discourse: that being the speech he made 
in Ein Rummaneh for the 7th anniversary of the 
beginning of the war (13/4/1982). It emphasised 
all of the abovementioned views of the various 
dangerous Syrian, Palestinian9F10 and more languid 
and hesitant Lebanese Other10F11  11 F12; the supremacy 
of the Christians 12F13 and their avant-garde 13F14role, 
while refuting any plans of secession and 
isolationism; all in a more intense and elaborate 
presentation.   
  
                                                          
نقول لالجئ الفلسطيني أن يبحث عن صحراء أخرى ينقل اليها خيامه و  10
يين في البوسطة ليسوا قادرين على رمينا و أن خمس فلسطين, تنكره للجميل
.في البحر  
ا ذا اضطررنا الى ازالة تل الزعتر و لماذي بدأ يتفهم لماذاللبناني األخر ال 11
قاومنل و حاربنا سبع سنوات و اليوم شريكنا اللبناني يعاني المعاناة التي 
نحن نحييهم و نهنئهم و لو تأخروا في . سنوات 7 ذعانينا و نعاني من
.  التصرف  
ان مصيره يقضي أن يشارك أخاه اللبناني ال أن يشارك : نقول له أيضا 12
. الغريب فلسطينيا كان أم سوريا  
13 ا المجتمع هو الألكثر ذه: الدامور, ترشيش, عبنطورة, زحلة, عين الرمانة
. ثباتا في لبنان  
ي جعلت الشيعي ينتفض في وجه الفلسطيني و جعلت ان مقاومتنا هي الت 14
.السني ينتفض في وجه السوري  
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Table 1: Content Analysis of 76 Arabic sources: 
(64) Speeches and (12) Articles. 
Category  Key Words  Arabic  Tally  Notes/Com
ments 
The Other  The Syrian  90 السوري 
Other 
Individualiz
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Table 2: Analysis of Bashir Gemayel’s Speech 
made in Ein El Rummaneh for the 7th anniversary 
of the beginning of the war (13/4/1982) 
Category  Key Words  Arabic  Tally  
The Other  The Syrian  4 السوري 
 
The 




Muslim   3 اللبناني المسلم 
 
Israel   0 اسرائيل 
  
  
Conflict  Foreigner  11 الغريب 
 
enemy   1 العدو 
 
Occupation/ 
Nightmare  4 الكابوس/االحتالل 
 
(Palestinian) 
Settlement   6 )اللبناني(التوطين 
 
Conspiracy  3 المؤامرة 
 
Terrorism   4 االرهاب 
 




Community   2 المجتمع المسيحي 
 
Collusion  2 التواطؤ 
 
Treachery   2 غدر 
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Liberation   4 تحرير 
 
Resistance 16 المقاومة و الصمود 
 
Sacrifice  2  التضحية 
 
10452 Km  1 
 
Civilization  1 الحضارة 
 
Conclusion 
The identity construction of the Phalange was a 
complex process that, being based on Maronite 
nationalist ideology, is strongly conscious of the 
Other. By examining the ways the Phalange 
identifies itself and its role, and the extent to 
which it complies with true fascist ideologies, 
one can understand the ways by which they 
identify the Other and the extent to which they 
will go in their daily interaction. The Other is, 
however, not a static one, nor formulated through 
religious differences, but entails a more diverse 
combination of factors. One of the important 
ones are the economic consideration that the 
Phalange must bear as a consequence of its 
unusual role as a Zaim representing the elite of 
Finance and Commerce as well as the Maronite 
community as a whole. Indeed the "family" is 
referred to as one of the three basic tenets to the 
Phalange's belief system in its anthem, strongly 
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indicating an association with and preservation of 
this traditional role, albeit in a modern guise. 
Similarly, the myth of a favoured and friendly 
Israeli Other, who is closer to the Phalange self is 
just that, a myth. 
The primary sources analysed are ideological 
writing by Pierre Gemayel and speeches by his 
son Bashir. I chose this succession of primary 
sources across a few decades so that the 
similarities and differences may highlight 
particularly important points pertaining to the 
question of the Other. The similarities between 
the writing reflect the great place the Other takes 
in Phalange ideology and action, in addition to 
showing how pure and predominantly fascist and 
reductionist perceptions of the Other are 
circumscribed and held in check in by the 
Phalange’s need to provide for its political and 
economic interests and those of the community 
and elites it represents. The differences on the 
other hand, highlight the intensification and 
radicalisation of their perception as threats seem 
more eminent, the Other more terrorising, 
proximal and thus a scale of Others is created 
where the less threatening Other is temporarily 
sought for help. According to AlAmal in October 
1980 "said the partition of the country had taken 
place in west Beirut which has fallen under the 
control of Syrian Baathists, Palestinians, 
communists and Arab nationalists invasion that 
sought to change Lebanon’s identity in order to 
49
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Arabise and Islamise the country. "real Lebanon" 
has been reduced to what is pejoratively is known 
as the Christian ghetto" (Traboulsi 211). That, in 
essence, sums up Phalange's perception of itself, 
identifies the various Others, the difference 
between them being mainly the different ways 
with which they identified the Lebanese state.  
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Appendix 1 – List of Anthems 
 هيا فتى الكتائب •
   النشيد الوطني اللبناني •
  الشيخ بيار بتبقى معن •
  اشرفية البداية •
  حزب الكتائب عالراس •
  ذكرى الـ70 •
  عالصخر منحفر كتائب •
  عريس الحلم االخضر •
  عسكر نحنا ما مننهاب •
  كتائب ام القضية كلها •
 لبيار التحية •
  مثل الشمس •
  من زمان •
  من هاك الملعب •
  منهتوف كتائب •
  نادتلي اليمامة •
  نقول ال •
  وينك يا هل واقف •
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  هّزت منازلنا •
  يا ريّسنا القائد •
  يا ليلة الليالي •
 يا موسع الساحات •
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